The Ninth IPS Conference on Plato's Republic (Tokyo 2010): Agenda and One Riddle

There were two questions on my agenda for Tokyo: How did the land named Japan give birth to a scholar like Norio Fujisawa? How did Japan produce the film director Akira Kurosawa? The latter is well-known among all cinema lovers. The former has been a very important Platonist (1925-2004) and professor at Kyoto University. He promoted considerably the studies of ancient philosophy in Japan. I have read only one text of his: ἔχειν, μετέχειν and Idioms of "Paradeigmatism" in Plato's Theory of Forms, Phronesis XIX (1974), pp. 30-58. It is admirable how critical he could be when trying to make the best out of the Aristotelian critique of methexis. Moreover he considered it is necessary to unveil the prevailing hermeneutics that is confined to the Aristotelian framework. The Japanese Platonist fulfilled crucial steps upon this path, for the sake of a genuine understanding of Plato. This contribution of his may be a rather small piece, better to say a treasure. There he provides enough evidence for his agreement with the principle of harmony (between Plato and Aristotle), which this blog promotes. Just read his article and you will see my deep appreciation is well-grounded.

Needless to say, I had no illusion I would be able to answer the two above questions in my one-week stay in Tokyo. Still it was important for me to ask these two questions and appropriately direct my attention in search of possible answers.

The organisation of the International Plato Society Conference was absolutely flawless. It was splendid to observe the entire organising team at work and experience the results of the excellent coordination. Pisa (2013) and Brasilia (2016) will have to try pretty hard in order to live up to the high standards Tokyo just set. Every one, myself included, was happy to be a guest in Tokyo.

I learned as far as I could during the conference. Admittedly I was concerned with my own paper until Friday because I should shorten it. Now I know, it is advantageous to give your paper at the beginning of such an international conference. Then you are able to concentrate on the following papers with no distraction. Moreover I had another task to fulfill: I tried to find two words to say on my Plato book. I wanted to say something substantial despite the fact that I was allowed to speak only for two minutes: an almost impossible task. During the conference and thanks to interesting, challenging and encouraging chats, I realised what I will be working on for the written version of my paper and beyond: dunamis-phusis-ananke. To be a little bit more precise, I have to elaborate the meanings of the notion of necessity that becomes crucial for the philosopher’s descent but, nonetheless, has not received the adequate attention in the relevant secondary literature so far as I see it. For the first time in my blog, I shall give it a go and mention a concrete textual riddle that caused my aporia, which I gladly shared with best listeners. The text (R. VII, 540a4-b7) runs (in translation) as follows:

Then, when they are fifty years old, those who have survived (the tests) and gained every highest distinction in every field, both in actions and studies, should now be brought at last to the goal. We should compel them [ἀναγκαστέον] to lift up the bright light of the soul and gaze steadfastly at that which provides light for everything. And when they have seen the good itself, they have [(to be compelled to), ἀναγκαστέον] to order the city, the citizens and themselves using that as a model, throughout the rest of their lives, when the turn comes for each. They can spend most of their life in philosophy, but when their turn comes, then each one must labour at the business of politics and be ruler for the sake of the city. They will regard the task not as something fine but as necessary. And after educating others like themselves in this way, and leaving them behind as the city’s guardians, they have [to be compelled!! ἀναγκαστέον] to live in the islands of the blest after their departure.

In my paper I decided to quote the above passage because it indicates that Plato uses the concept of “necessity” quite often (in the seventh Book and not only). The passage shows that he is not extremely careful when he uses the word ἀνάγκη, which happens to be an especially important concept for the problem of descent. I underline the three infinitives that depend on ἀναγκαστέον (540a8). In the case of the first infinitive, we may understand that the educators of the ideal city compel the philosophers to reach the goal of the program. In the second case, compulsion is also relevant for the philosophers’ coming back to the cave, even if I regard it as derivative in my paper. But what about the third case? How can the dead philosophers be compelled, and by whom, to live in the islands of the blest?
Up to now, there have been two helpful reactions to this baffling passage. At first go, David Sedley tried to save Plato from nonsense in that he suggested the notion of compulsion doesn't really extend all the way through. In English, one may say to a child "I am going to force you to do your homework first, and to watch television afterwards", without meaning that one is going to force her to watch television. Christopher Rowe suggested that in this case Plato playfully alludes to a former instance regarding the islands of the blest. “The philosophers will be compelled to depart for the islands of the blest” means that they really have to be compelled to do so whereas they themselves prefer to do philosophy.
All I intended to do myself was not to blame Plato for such a mindless slip but to utter my reservations toward everyone who bases arguments (and every one does in the framework of the philosopher's descent and not only) on passages in which "necessity" occurs. Now I have to draw and elaborate my picture. Let us try and solve together the above riddle for the start.

Does anyone come up with any suggestion ad loc?

Mayweek 2009: The Politicus

The last week of May is the well-known Mayweek in Cambridge: A workshop interprets an ancient philosophical text through close and intensive reading. This Mayweek was organized by Malcolm Schofield and was devoted to the Platonic Politicus. The speakers who presented the entire dialogue were: Dimitri El Murr, Sylvain Delcomminette, Christopher Rowe, David Sedley, Sarah Broadie, Nicholas Denyer, Melissa Lane, Robert Wardy, Malcolm Schofield.

The following are some of the issues broached and some of the questions raised:
-What are we looking for when looking for "Plato"?
-Broader framework of hermeneutics: a. General: Should we pursue an inner-dialogue or inter-dialogue hermeneutics? b. On the basis of the concrete object of inquiry: Should we regard the Politicus as a transition from the Republic to the Laws (developmentalistic reading)?
-Form of the dialogue (dialectics as dialogue) and various literary aspects. Among other themes: a. The disposition of the dialogue partner joung Socrates. b. The Visitor as Platonic dramatis persona.  The (in)famous Straussian hostility between the Eleatic Visitor and Socrates was not represented. c. Why didn't Plato write down a dialogue on the nature of the philosopher? That Plato deliberately refrained from composing such a dialogue becomes clear at 257b8. For, whenever the leading interlocutor postpones the discussion of a subject with the aid of εἰς αὖθις, he never fulfils our expectation.

-As far as methodos is concerned, we may ask: Can we unify the diversity of methods applied in the Politicus? Should "διαλεκτικώτερον περὶ πάντα" (285d) refer exclusively to the method of division?
-Platonic division and the Aristotelian critical approach
-Should the Myth be divided into two or three phases? What is the background against which a threefold division is proposed (by Rowe)? Does the myth entail good paradigms? Is the myth a good paradigm at all?
- Does Plato become a precursor of the Aristotelian concept γνωριμώτερον ἡμῖν when the Eleatic Visitor demonstrates the role of παραδείγματα?
-The digression on the two kinds of measurement: How should we understand αὐτὸ τἀκριβές (284d1f.)?
-Method and Object: Do the investigation into dialectics and the inquiry into statesmanship come into conflict? Sayre, who stresses methodology and dialectics, and Skemp, who prefers to focus on the inquiry on the statesman, represent two extremes. Is the Platonic methodos inseparable from its object or does it abstract from its object and become formal? To reformulate our question with the help of two modern cases: Should we take the Hegelian or the New-Kantian approach on methodos?
- How does the weaving art creep in when we define the statesmanship (305e3f.)?
- Mimesis in the discussion about the different constitutions and problems related to these obscure passages.
-The discussion boiled down to the appropriate question: Which dialogue is διαλεκτικώτερος: the Sophist or the Politicus? After such an enriching week, the Politicus was rehabilitated as it deserves. The above question remains open because we then have to ask with which measure we are going to compare the two dialogues so as to make our judgement concerning dialectics. They offer to some extent similar but also different aspects of Platonic dialectics. How longer would each of these two dialogues be, had (the) Plato(nic Guest) wanted to talk more on the issues that he deliberately and explicitly left aside? How longer would the Politicus be, had the Eleatic Guest been willing to say more on the ἀπόδειξις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς? How longer would the Sophist become, if Plato had chosen more than five greatest kinds? And what about the discussion on Non-Being as contrary to Being? With how many scenarios can we come up? In the worst case, would the Sophist grow into something like the second part of the Parmenides? I draw just an analogy because it would make quite a difference had the interlocutor been Theaetetus and not Aristoteles. Second scenario: would we encounter the second chapter of the fourth book of Aristotelian metaphysics as a dialogue? Third, but not last possible scenario: A dialogue on the Philosophos? There is a second crucial question that suggests itself after the one we ask about the appropriate measurement of the dialogues' (possible) lengths: Which is the whole against the background of which we should compare the different parts and aspects, the bits and pieces of dialectics that the Platonic dialecticians perform in each dialogue? How are we going to judge which dialogue is διαλεκτικώτερος?

Such a successful meeting is certainly going to provoke various reflections, and the discussions on Plato are to be continued.
I found it particularly interesting to see that and how an idealistic approach (or rather tendency in a given paper) was welcome and cross-examined in Cambridge. Needless to say, we ought to do so with arguments of any origin and irrespective of their origin but, in this case, I was happy to experience a genuine dialogue and a remarkable openness in the Anglo-Saxon context, which in general remains sceptic toward idealistic readings of Plato. Let me grasp the opportunity and recall the following: a. Myles Burnyeat's seminal lecture "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed" (Philosophical Review 91, 1982) and b. Paul Natorp's "Platons Ideenlehre" (1903, 1921 with a very important epilogue) was translated into English only some time ago (2004, International Plato Studies 18, edited, translated and introduced by Vassilis Politis).
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Back to Business: The Phaedrus in Cambridge

Against the background of catchy sounds and rhythms, it is time to return to the business (so ἐπιτήδευμα) of philosophy. As I promised, here is a picture I can draw of the past Colloquium on the Phaedrus:
Plato has taught us to philosophize on types and thoughts rather than on persons. I will thus allow myself to avoid any references to living scholars. We should express though our special thanks to Jenny Bryan and Helen van Noorden for organizing this meeting.

So as to sum up the moral of the conference in my own words and according to my understanding: There are no absolute boundaries between the hermeneutics on the different sides of the Channel, although there are still proponents of two-world theories or rather prejudices. As I happen to be neither harmonist nor harmonizer, I do not want to level any differences. I am just asserting that this conference may have been held in Germany as well. The reading sessions were, as expected, very fruitful, on some occassions even stronger than given papers.
Schleiermacher was present, as always in current Anglo-Saxon context. Once more it proved to be problematic and intriguing to integrate the relation of philia and eros as well as mania into their cultural environment and to fathom the relation between rhetoric and dialectics.
Surprisingly for me, even one kind of Derrida's reading was represented. I remind that a number of academics from Cambridge University tried to stop the granting of his Cambridge doctoral degree (1992). They were out-numbered when it was put to a vote, which happens very rarely indeed in such a procedure. As far as interesting political gestures concern, it seems to me that the following question suggests itself: Are we able to, and, if we are, should we put Dadaism into a museum? The answer I am inclined to give is a negative one I am afraid.

The weather is all Greek to me for the time being and the Sun-days spent in the famous orchard in Grantchester are recreative...

Plato in Tübingen. "Tübinger Platon-Tage 2008: Über das Göttliche"

Tübingen has become popular since H.-J. Krämer's ground-breaking publication "Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles" (1959) and Gaiser's following "Ungeschriebene Lehre Platons" (1962 and 1968). We do not have to agree with G. Reale's exaggerated declaration that the Tübingen School (Hans Joachim Krämer, Konrad Gaiser and Thomas Alexander Szlezák among others) introduced "a new paradigm" into Plato interpretation because the debate between a systematic and a non-systematic Plato was alive at least ever since Hegel's time. The Tübinger School became known in the Anglo-Saxon world because of the hot debate between Vlastos and Krämer in the early sixties, starting with Vlastos' review of Krämer's dissertation that caused latter's reaction and subsequent chain reactions that included others as well (Th. Szlezák).
Admittedly this is far from being the first Plato Conference that takes place in Tübingen. What is Tübingen aiming at now, 2008, with this first conference labeled "Tübinger Platon-Tage"? Dietmar Koch, Prof. Dr. Männlein-Robert and Niels Weindtmann, who organize the Conference that will take place every two years in Tübingen, intend to revive the Tübingen Plato-tradition in Germany and abroad, and to turn Tübingen into a forum for dialogue on Plato again.
At this conference, I will discuss an extremely debated passage in Nomoi, which gradually became very famous, if not infamous, the passage on the "bad soul". But first, there are some steps to be fulfilled in my attempt to free the receptacle in the Timaeus from the charge of being bad: a topic for another occasion.
General information (in German) and the subjects of the following conferences on Plato (2010 and 2012) can be found in the link:
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/philosophie/platontage/index.htm
The program and timetable of the conference in which I will learn a lot from all these profound and experienced Professors can be downloaded:
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/philosophie/platontage/programm.pdf

PS: Wolfgang Rainer-Mann wrote an article entitled "Plato in Tübingen" (OSAP 2006). He started to write a review of Gaiser's "Gesammelte Schriften" (ed. by Th. Szlezák, Academia Verlag 2004) but ended composing a forty-pages general critique against Tübingen Plato interpretation. We should take his rather superficial critique of the so-called Tübinger School with a grain of salt. I expected something philosophically more interesting and objective by such a sagacious philosopher who composed a very challenging book on the Aristotelian Categories (The Discovery of Things).